PREFACE: BACKGROUND OF THE EKERN-WILSON
ARTICLE
Steinar Ekern
The choice of my contribution to this Festschrift honoring Bob Wilson may
seem somewhat odd: It does not fall within game theory, it is a jointly written
paper, it is an old paper, and the journal is a respected one but hardly at the
very top tier. On the other hand, it illustrates Bob’s breadth of interest and
insight outside his traditional major ﬁelds, shows how he cooperated with a
doctoral student and provided the essentials for successful publication, and the
coauthored article was frequently cited for more than a decade in the major
journals of economics and business.
Coming from the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (nhh) — nicknamed the Norwegian School of Uncertainty — in Bergen, my
interest in the broad subject area of the economics of uncertainty was nurtured
by the seminal works of faculty members such as Karl Borch, Jan Mossin, and
Agnar Sandmo. At Stanford, I had ﬁnished my course work and was developing
a dissertation proposal, when I experienced any doctoral candidate’s nightmare:
In an article in the Journal of Economic Theory, Drèze and Modigliani reported
major results that I had hoped to develop in my dissertation. After I had struggled extensively to ﬁnd another suitable dissertation topic, Bob, as my advisor,
simply told me “I think I’ll assign you a topic.” He then suggested that I
explore the relationships between capital markets and decision making under
uncertainty in the ﬁrm. In particular, he recommended studying the objective of the ﬁrm in decision problems with incomplete markets, with respect to
optimality properties, decision rules, information requirements, and valuation
functions.
At ﬁrst look, the answers seemed obvious. The expected utility hypothesis
for individual decision-making, value maximization by ﬁrms, and Pareto optimality of competitive resource allocations were all well established pillars. Bob
was less than enthusiastic about assuming that ﬁrms have utility functions. He
stressed that the actual decision maker in a ﬁrm must have an incentive to
act according to the stockholders’ preferences. The failure of the market value
rule to bring about a Pareto optimal allocation of investment had recently been
pointed out by Stiglitz and by Jensen and Long (see references at the end of the
paper itself).
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In an unpublished comment on Stiglitz, Bob argued that to show the market
value maximizing investment to be non-Pareto optimal did not say anything
about whether investments would be Pareto optimal, unless it was demonstrated
that it would be rational for the decision maker to maximize stock value. Bob
then showed that the decision maker, who might be any stockholder of the
ﬁrm, in mean-variance models would voluntarily, out of self-interest, choose a
Pareto optimal level of investment for the ﬁrm rather than a value maximizing
investment. A well-known economist stated that he wavered back and forth in
trying to decide whether that result was a brilliant insight concerning motivation
in managerial decision making or whether it came close to being a tautology.
The joint paper to follow and my subsequent dissertation originated in Bob’s
suggestion to me to attempt to generalize such a unanimity property to a statepreference model. A slight generalization of Diamond’s earlier model and Leland’s concurrent one provided unanimity at a capital market equilibrium. Noting that, in this case, the ﬁrm’s marginal state-dependent return could be written as a linear combination of the returns to the riskless ﬁrm and to the ﬁrm
itself, the extension was straightforward. First, assume the system is evaluated
at a capital market equilibrium, such that each individual’s implicit valuation of
the returns of any ﬁrm equals the ﬁrm’s equilibrium value. Second, write out the
condition for any stockholder to change the decision variable of the ﬁrm. Third,
invoke the spanning condition that the available state-dependent returns in the
whole economy span the marginal state-dependent return for the ﬁrm whose
decision will be evaluated. Fourth, show that the sign of the decision criterion
is the same for all stockholders holding positive fractions. Finally, note that
the criterion coincides with market value maximization only when individuals’
implicit state-prices are ﬁxed independently of the ﬁrm’s decision.
The jointly authored paper to follow contains what was later referred to
as “the Ekern-Wilson unanimity theorem,” “the Ekern-Wilson spanning condition,” or “an Ekern-Wilson equilibrium.” The article appeared in print as a
part of a “Symposium on the Optimality of Competitive Capital Markets” in the
Spring 1974 issue of the Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science
(from 1975 simply the Bell Journal of Economics and, since 1984, the RAND
Journal of Economics). The symposium issue contained companion papers by
Leland and by Merton and Subrahmanyam, as well as an extension by Radner
(who seems to have been a referee for the joint paper). My own extensions of
the joint work with Bob can be found in my 1973 Stanford dissertation, partly
published in the Swedish Journal of Economics (1974) (later renamed the Scandinavian Journal of Economics) as well as in an addendum in the Bell Journal
of Economics (1975).
Over the years the joint paper generated a triple-digit number of citations
in the literature, which is another testimony to Bob’s standing in the economic
profession, as the paper is not among the ten articles he has selected for mentioning in the reference book Who’s Who in Economics. It has been quoted,
discussed, and criticized in papers on ﬁnancial markets, equilibrium models,
resource allocation, optimal investments, production decisions, competitive versus monopolistic pricing, objective functions, decision theory, incentives, ﬁnan-
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cial strategies, majority voting, corporate control, international trade, product
diﬀerentiation, accounting, information, ﬁnancial intermediaries, and internal
organization, among others.
Bob ends his self-biographic entry in Who’s Who in Economics by writing
“Working with doctoral students is a great pleasure.” I feel conﬁdent that all of
his former doctoral students will reciprocate with something like “Working with
Bob as a doctoral student was a great privilege.” As for myself, it is obvious
that I have a great intellectual debt and a profound academic gratitude to Bob.
He directed me into the area of my dissertation, patiently listened to my ideas,
gave me more good advice than I was able to absorb, and from time to time
exercised a gentle pressure on me to get the research done within a reasonable
time. Also, as evident from our joint paper to follow, Bob contributed his
remarkable insight and generously gave me the opportunity to be a coauthor of
a widely read paper.
I am not aware that Bob has any Scandinavian ancestors, but for some
unknown reason a disproportionate number of Scandinavian economists have
beneﬁted from being taken in under Bob’s wings — some people talk humorously
about “the Wilson Scandinavian maﬁa.” In addition to the ones for whom he
has served as a principal dissertation advisor, he has been a frequent member of
dissertation committees, a useful informal discussion partner, and an agreeable
sponsor for visiting scholars. In 1986 he was awarded the honorary dr. oecon.
degree at nhh in recognition of his services, and he has continued to visit the
School on academic business since. There is a widespread hope that when —
or if — he retires from Stanford, we’ll be able to attract him for more frequent
visits to Bergen to stimulate and enhance our research.

